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The Art and Science of Genetic Modification:
Re-Engineering Patent Law and
Constitutional Orthodoxies
YVONNE CRIPPS"
INTRODUCTION
I am delighted and honored to inaugurate the Harry T. Ice Chair of Law
and to have this opportunity to thank my colleagues for their wonderfully warm
welcome to Bloomington. They have created a supremely stimulating and colle-
gial environment in the Law School and have done so much to include me in all
aspects of this outstanding community. I am extremely grateful to them and to
the Ice Miller partnership for the immense privilege of being the holder of the
Chair endowed by the partnership in honor of the great Harry T. Ice.
After graduating from Harvard Law School in 1929, Harry T. Ice Joined a
firm then known as Matson Carter Ross & McCord. At that time, the firm con-
sisted of a small group of talented lawyers; by the time of Harry's death in 1982 it
had, under his inspired leadership and guidance, grown into a firm of ninety law-
yers with an outstanding national reputation. It has been a particular pleasure to
meet Harry's family today and to share their Joy at this occasion in his honor.
Shortly after I arrived in Bloomington, Bill Riggs, one of the senior partners
of Ice Miller, very kindly gave me a book written by Harry T. Ice about the firm.'
Reading it reinforced my sadness at never having met Harry. Despite his consid-
erable modesty about his achievements, he was clearly a pivotal member of the
partnership, inspiring his colleagues through his own example and his love for the
firm as a group of individuals engaged in a common purpose. The book whetted
my appetite to know more about the man himself, so with the help of Colleen
* This is the text of a lecture inaugurating the Harry T. Ice Chair of Law at the Indiana Uni-
versity School of Law in Bloomington. The lecture was delivered in February 2002. Although
some later inclusions have been possible, the law is stated at that date. I would like to express deep
thanks to my research assistants, Christopher Humphreys and Jeffrey Ankrom, and my col-
leagues Dawn Johnsen (Indiana University) and Elisabeth Zoller (University of Paris) for their ex-
cellent advice on some of the more difficult issues raised by this subject.
1. HARRY T. ICE, HISTORY OF A HOOSIER LAW FIRM: ICE MILLER DONADIO & RYAN AND ITS
PREDECESSORS 1910-1980 (1980).
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Pauwels and her excellent staff in the Law School's Library, I learned more about
Harry Ice's unstinting contributions to the life of his firm and wider community.
He was, by all accounts, always finding ways to assist others to achieve their goals,
both within the firm and in Indianapolis, which was the focal point for his many
charitable activities. His willingness to make his time and talents available to the
many who would benefit from them is reflected not only in his colleagues' com-
ments but also in the newspaper records of his many civic good works.
I trust that Harry would not have disapproved of my topic today, for all that
I have heard and read about him suggests that he would encourage a struggling
colleague in the law, and I shall hope for that indulgence from you too. The title
of this lecture speaks of re-engineering and modification because my topic today is
genetic engineering, or recombinant DNA technology. This includes cloning
because, as we shall see, even cloning involves a small amount of recombination
of DNA: clones are not absolutely genetically identical to the organism from
which they are cloned.2
It was our own Hoosier, James Watson, who-in collaboration with Francis
Crick, and basing his hypotheses on work by Rosalind Franklin 3-discovered
the magnificent double-helix structure of the DNA molecule. This is one of the
many scientific structures that we can admire almost as if they were works of art:
there is great beauty in that complex but symmetrical form. Watson and Crick
did not patent their discovery. In the 1950s,4 it would have been thought both ab-
surd and offensive to patent what would rightly have been regarded as the dis-
covery of a natural element (such as the structure of a molecule or the molecule
itself), regardless of whether it was as fundamental to life as this one. A patent
grants a limited monopoly right over the subject matter of the patent, as part of
a so-called intellectual property, designed to provide incentives for the produc-
tion of inventions rather than the discovery of natural elements or forces. Al-
though that point has been extremely well established in patent practice and case
law, it is an interesting and little noted feature of Article I of the Constitution
2. See, e.g., Taeyoung Shin et al., A Cat Cloned by Nuclear Transplantation, 415 NATURE 859
(2002).
3. The role of Rosalind Franklin in this discovery is described in ANNE SAYRE, ROSALIND
FRANKLIN AND DNA (1975) and BRENDA MADDOX, ROSALIND FRANKLIN: THE DARK LADY OF DNA
(2002).
4. Nowadays there are attempts to build life using just a few basic chemicals, notably in Craig
Venter's Minimal Genome Project. See Nick Campbell, I Can't Live Without You, 4 NATURE
REVIEws GENETICS 405 (2003).
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that it refers to the power of Congress to secure for inventors rights to their "dis-
coveries," but the constitutional wording also requires "inventors."
As a lawyer interested in biotechnology, I find it difficult to restrict myself to
any one of the many interconnected areas in which law and biotechnology inter-
sect. Administrative law, constitutional law, criminal law, employment law, en-
vironmental law, evidence, family law, insurance law, intellectual property law,
the law of succession, and tort law, to name but a few, all impinge on this rapidly
developing technology. But since, unlike Dolly the sheep,5 we are, for the
present, confined to what we think of as our real age and real time, it might be
prudent to focus today on one area in particular, knowing that this too will in-
volve inevitable excursions into related areas of law. Thus I am going to concen-
trate on intellectual property law, and in particular patents, and my emphasis
today will be on medical rather than agricultural developments.6 Patent law il-
lustrates several of what I perceive to be the most important legal issues arising
from biotechnology. While I am attempting not to stray too far from patent law,
it is, however, difficult to resist noting in passing that several individuals have
paid significant fees to sign up with an organization that has purported to copy-
right their DNA or genetic code in order to protect their intellectual property
rights to themselves for the day when others clone them without permission.
Such cloning may eventually be possible from a hair removed, for instance, from
a coat hanging in a cloakroom. Some potentially fascinating criminal as well as
civil law issues arise in that context, not least in relation to theft, misappropria-
tion, and trade dress or passing off, but we must save those for another day. It
suffices for the moment to note that, from a website7 that appeared in 2001, the
DNA Copyright Institute offers services including archiving clients' genetic
data (for use, for example, as evidence in DNA misappropriation actions). The
5. Before Dolly's birth in July 1996, reports appeared on the technique that had been used. See,
e.g., K.H.S. Campbell et al., Sheep Cloned by Nuclear Transfer from a Cultured Cell Line, 380
NATURE 64 (1996). The announcement specific to Dolly appeared as I. Wilmut et al., Viable Off-
spring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385 NATURE 810 (1997).
6. 1 have discussed agricultural developments elsewhere. See, e.g., Yvonne Cripps, Aspects of
Intellectual Property in Biotechnology: Some European Legal Perspectives, in PROTECTION OF GLOBAL
BIODIVERSITY: CONVERGING STRATEGIES 316 (Lakshman D. Guruswamy & Jeffery A. McNeely eds.,
1998). 1 also discuss agricultural as well as medicinal and human biological issues in Yvonne
Cripps, Patenting Resources: Biotechnology and the Concept of Sustainable Development, 9 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119 (2001) [hereinafter Patenting Resources].
7. DNA Copyright Institute, http://www.dnacopyright.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
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"Institute" makes no claim that the company will register DNA with the Copy-
right Office of the Library of Congress and no direct claim that such a registra-
tion is possible. Nonetheless, it quotes from the Copyright Act and proclaims
that "it should be possible for any person to establish a DNA Copyright for
themselves [sic]."' We are not, however, told how a work is created for this pur-
pose, or when the crucial creation occurs.
We shall also see that litigation over patents on biotechnological inventions
can give rise to questions of constitutional law and environmental law, as in the
case of the patent on the Harvard mouse, which has been tested on constitutional
grounds by the Supreme Court of Canada,9 and on environmental grounds by
the European Patent Office." The mouse was genetically engineered to be par-
ticularly susceptible to cancer. We shall return to Harvard and its famous mice
shortly.
I. ANNEXING NATURE AND STIFLING INNOVATION
While it is true that many different fields of law impinge upon biotechnol-
ogy, biotechnology is perhaps the only technology directly to have led to major
alterations in patent law and practice. I refer here to my belief that the extraor-
dinary nature of biotechnology has altered the ways in which the fundamental,
traditional tenets of patent law are applied in that field. These classic tenets re-
quire an invention that is, among other things, novel, nonobvious, and useful.
Belief on the part of governments and patent offices in the power of biotechnol-
ogy, and therefore in its commercial potential, has in my opinion combined with
fear of loss of competitiveness in international markets, to cause the traditional
tests or standards for patentability to be dropped to alarmingly low levels, or in
some instances ignored in all but name. This trend would be disturbing even if
the inventions in question were of a purely mechanical nature, but is of much
greater concern where the subject matter of the patent applications is an entire
8. Id. at http://www.dnacopyright.con/copyrightinformation/index.html.
9. Comm'r of Patents v. Harvard Coll., [2002] 219 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Can.).
10. European Patent No. 0 169 762 (application published Jan. 29, 1986),availableat LEXIS EP-
B 1696000072. For history and official announcement, see 1992 O.J. EuL- PAT. OFF. 588, available
at http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/pressrel/pdf/oj 1992_1 0p588_593.pdf.
11. Semiconductor chip technology and other technologies relating to computing and databases
led to alterations in intellectual property law as they emerged, but their impact was largely on
copyright law.
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living organism or a part of a human being. For example, numerous patents
have already been granted over human genes, 2 and in some cases over parts of
human genes, even where the functions of those parts (or expressed sequence
tags) are unknown. The Patent Office has since indicated that it will be more
rigorous in requiring applicants to show functionality in this context, but the
standard is still applied loosely, with the patent office allowing the use of auto-
mated programs that enable researchers to "guess" the identity and function of a
protein encoded by a gene based on the similarity of a fragment to other known
genes. 3 How did human gene sequences of unknown function meet patent law's
utility requirement, even if they met the inventive-step requirement and even
supposing they were inventions as opposed to discoveries? Arguments based on
purification scarcely suffice. And why have the thresholds in the tests for patent-
ability been dropped so low in relation to patents on organisms when, apart from
any higher order moral questions, common sense and the pragmatism normally
characteristic of patent offices would suggest that patenting what might very
crudely be described as the raw materials ofbiotechnological research and devel-
opment may well impede rather than encourage inventiveness in this sphere?
The major purpose of the Patent Act, mandated by Article I of the Constitution,
is to provide an incentive for inventiveness. When patents are granted on genes,
human or otherwise, any scientist or team, whether operating in the private or
the public sector, is required to pay the patent holder if the gene is used diagnos-
tically, in a therapy, or in a pharmaceutical product. 4
Let us consider just two of several situations where the patenting of a
human gene has had extremely undesirable consequences for research and de-
velopment, for those in need of medical treatment, and ultimately for patent
holders.'5 Genes that influence the development of breast cancer have been dis-
covered and patented-these are known as BRCAI and BRCA2. These genes,
in addition to a test to determine whether a woman has the genes, were patented
12. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,397,696 (issued Mar. 14, 1995), available at http'//patft.uspto.gov/
natahtml/srchum.htm.
13. See Paul Smaglik,As US Tightens up on 'Speculative' Claims, 403 NATURE 3 (2000).
14. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 722 (2d ed.
2001).
15. For a discussion of the patentability of methods of medical treatment, see MARTIN J.
ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 119-32 (2d ed. 2003).
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by Myriad Genetics. 6 Myriad has charged as much as Can $4,000 (per test appli-
cation) to those who wish to administer the test, including hospitals. 7 Many hos-
pitals and other health care providers will not pay such a high fee for a single
test, and many individuals cannot afford it, especially if any insurance they may
have does not extend to it. The situation is aggravated by the fact that, since the
discovery of the genes, testing for their presence involves an extremely simple
and cheap procedure. Thus the $2,680 fee in respect of what many would regard
as the discovery of the natural phenomena of genes relating to breast cancer is
hard to justify. The European Parliament has led opposition to the patents in
Europe, 18 and the Government of British Columbia-arguing that it could not
afford to fund the tests-cancelled them in its publicly funded hospitals. The
Government of Ontario rebelled by taking the extremely unusual step, espe-
cially for a public body, of "ignoring the patent and paying another provider
$800 to test for the gene."' 9 Myriad, perhaps overwhelmed, or at least tempo-
rarily cowed, by the adverse reactions to its patents has complained but not taken
legal action against what would seem to be an infringement of its patent rights.
Its position is weakened by the perception that its patent was granted in relation
to what could more properly be viewed as a discovery rather than an invention,
and a discovery of a naturally occurring human gene at that. It will also not have
received any comfort from the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
blocking the patent on the Harvard mouse."0 The Court decided that when the
Canadian legislature drafted the Canadian Patent Act (which is in broad terms
16. Myriad was granted U.S. patents for forty-seven mutations of BRCA1 alone. Myriad Re-
ceives Patent for BRCAI Mutations, 390 NATURE 546 (1997); see also Kimberly Blanton, Corporate
Takeover Exploiting the US Patent System: A Single Company Has Gained Control over Genetic Re-
search and Testing for Breast Cancer, and Scientists, Doctors, and Patients Have to Play by Its Rules,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2002, at Magazine 10, available at 2002 WL 4113872.
17. See Declan Butler & Sally Goodman, French Researchers Take a Stand Against Cancer Gene
Patent, 413 NATURE 95 (2001). Fees to patients have varied, but one report cites $2,680 as a represen-
tative fee in the U.S. in 2001. Gautam Naik, Myriad Faces New Assaults on Its Gene Patents, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 26, 2002, at D4, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3407134. See David Akin, For Science or Money,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 5, 2002, at A15, available at www.davidakin.com/clips/
sciencemoney.html.
18. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution on the Patenting of BRCA1 and BRCA2 ('breast can-
cer') Genes (Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/biotech/eu-brca.html;
Naik, supra note 17 at D4; and French Institutions Oppose Myriad Genetics's Monopoly on Gene Tests
(Sept. 26, 2002), available at http://www.gene.ch/genet/2002/Oct/msg00007.html.
19. See Akin, supra note 17, at A15.
20. Comm'r of Patents, 219 D.L.R. (4th) at 577.
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the same as the equivalent legislation in the United States) it did not intend to
allow the grant of patents on higher organisms. That decision is particularly
striking because patents on the Harvard mouse have been widely accepted in
many jurisdictions and were part of what seemed to have become the wisdom,
received ever since the late 1970s,21 that organisms that have been intentionally
genetically altered by man are in general patentable. One cannot imagine the
same Canadian court upholding a patent annexing naturally occurring, unmod-
ified human genes such as BRCA1 and BRCA2. Myriad was very wise not to sue
Ontario, though it took that decision even before the Canadian Supreme Court
gave its decision on the Harvard mouse. The results of the various European op-
positions to Myriad's European patents are still awaited.
The capacity of doctors to diagnose and study the severe illness of hemochro-
matosis is also being impeded by the patenting of a gene, HFE. (When HFE bears
two common mutations, it is a key cause of a dangerous build up of iron in the
body, leading to hemochromatosis.) The patent-which extends, inter alia, to the
gene and a test for the gene-was initially granted to the Mercator corporation in
1998 but has since been sold from company to company, with each company en-
forcing the patent.22 This is especially regrettable because, although severe, the ill-
ness can be treated easily and very inexpensively once diagnosed. The authors of
a study published in Nature23 found that approximately one third of the laborato-
ries that they contacted in the United States had either stopped carrying out tests
for the HFE mutation or had never introduced them because of the restrictions
imposed by the holders of the patent on the HFE gene. Thus further work on the
gene is being impeded, defeating the central purpose of the patent system, which
is to facilitate understanding and encourage inventiveness by making available in-
formation that can lead to innovation. Here the effect in practical terms is the op-
posite, as scientists' hands are tied by a patent on the fundamental organic matter
upon which they might base developments. And the so-called experimental use ex-
ception, as currently narrowly interpreted and applied, is of very little assistance.
24
21. The world's first patent on a genetically engineered organism was granted to General Elec-
tric in relation to a genetically engineered single-celled Pseudomonas bacterium invented by
Ananda M. Chakrabarty. See U.K. Patent No. 1,436,573 (issued May 19, 1976).
22. See Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test: The Pitfalls of Patents Are Illustrated by
the Case of Haemochromatosis, 415 NATURE 577-78 (2002).
23. Id.
24. See Mark D. Janis, Sustainable Agriculture, Patent Rights, and Plant Innovation, 9 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 91,105-17 (2001).
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In more conventional situations, the initial patent grant can be justified by
the inventiveness of the original patent applicant, but it is difficult to regard an
unmodified human gene as a product of man rather than a product of nature. I
stress the word "unmodified" because, in 1980, the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Chakrabarty case25 decided that the world's first genetically engi-
neered organism was patentable. That organism, a single-celled bacterium, had
been genetically manipulated by human intervention into an organism not
thought to be found in nature; thus the Supreme Court was able to decide that
the patent application in relation to the engineered bacterium was for a product
of man rather than a product of nature, within the usual criteria of patent law.
The patents on human genes have not yet been tested before the Supreme Court
but it is in my view much more difficult to argue that an unmodified gene is a
product of man. The examples of patents on human genes to which I have spe-
cifically referred relate to genes of known function. The most surprising patents
of all, in terms of the classic prerequisites for patentability, are those on unmod-
ified nucleotide sequences of human genes where the function of the sequences
is not known.26 We have already touched upon the point that it is a fundamental
tenet of patent law that a patent will be granted only on an invention which is,
among other things, useful.
As if all these inroads into orthodox patent law were not sufficiently dis-
turbing, there has also been a marked tendency in the biotechnological field to
grant patents that are overbroad-in other words, where the applicant for a
patent claims more than is fully disclosed or demonstrated by the patent specifi-
cation. Those seeking patents have an interest in encompassing as much as pos-
sible within the limited monopoly that a patent confers. Patent law, prior to the
age of recombinant DNA research, could generally be relied upon to control
overbroad claims by virtue of the fear that if a claim was overbroad the patent
application would fail, not least for insufficient disclosure. Indeed the art of
drafting a patent claim so that it is neither too broad nor unnecessarily narrow is
extremely difficult and rightly highly valued. In the biotechnological field, how-
ever, some startlingly overbroad patents have been granted. The patenting of the
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and an overbroad claim to virtually any appli-
25. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
26. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,397,696, supra note 12.
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cation of it27 should have served as a warning. The PCR is a biochemical reaction
that most genetic engineers will need to use. At least that patent relates to a pro-
cess rather than a product, but even in the sphere of biotechnologicalproduct pat-
ents some extremely broad claims have been granted. An interesting example of
this occurred with the patents on the clone Dolly, our now faded superstar sheep.
Indeed, in what was a very bad fortnight for sheep clones, both Dolly and her
Australian counterpart Matilda died.28
Although in her patented form Dolly was a Scottish invention, we New
Zealanders will admit to an affinity with these shy but not unfriendly creatures
that outnumber New Zealand humans in their own country by twenty to one. I
refer to sheep as shy, but Dolly the clone became so used to human contact from
her earliest days that like a true star, and quite unlike sheep less used to the lime-
light, she actually came forward to meet one, or rather more sadly in the latter
days of her premature aging, limped forward. The patents granted on Dolly re-
late not only to all sheep produced by the "Dolly method" of cloning, to which I
shall return in a moment, but also to all nonhuman mammalian animals pro-
duced by that method as well as to human cell lines produced by that method.
Those patents are so broad that they may be argued to extend to the cloning of a
human being by the Dolly method.
It is crucial to an understanding of the patents granted on Dolly and other
clones to appreciate something of the technique that produced her. (We shall not
go into the trademarks on Dolly today, not even to dwell upon the substantial
likelihood of confusion when it comes to comparing one sheep likeness with an-
other.) Note also that both the process used to clone Dolly and Dolly herself have
been patented-that is the product Dolly as well as the process of cloning that
created her. Animal clones have been produced since the 1960s,29 but Dolly was
remarkable in that she was the first mammal to be cloned from a somatic cell, as
27. See U.S. Patent No. 4,683,195 (issued July 28, 1987); U.S. Patent No. 4,683,202 (issued July
28, 1987).
28. Matilda died unexpectedly on Feb. 1, 2003, and was cremated without extensive post mor-
tem analysis. See Alastair Dalton, Cloned Sheep Death Mystery, THE SCOTSMAN, Feb. 8,2003, avail-
able at http://www.news.scotsman.com/archive.cfm?id = 156502003. Dolly was put down on Feb.
14, 2003. See John Whitfield, Obituary: Dolly the Sheep, NATURE SCI. UPDATE/NEWS, Feb. 18, 2003,
available at http://www.nature.com/nsu/030217/030217-6.html.
29. See, e.g., J.B. Gurdon, Adult Frogs Derivedfrom the Nuclei of Single Somatic Cells, 4 DEVELOP-
MENTAL BIOLOGY 256 (1962).
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opposed to a reproductive cell, such as an egg or a sperm cell.3" Unlike a repro-
ductive cell, a somatic cell contains the full complement of a creature's chromo-
somes. It is a mature differentiated cell that could, for example, be used for
cloning from the skin or the liver or the heart of an adult; from a male or a fe-
male beyond the fertile reproductive years. This possibility fundamentally alters
the reproductive landscape. It involves mammalian cloning from an adult cell
rather than a reproductive one. Once the cell taken from the creature being
cloned is stimulated to replicate (in the case of the Dolly method, by means of the
application of an electrical charge to the mammary-gland cell nucleus in ques-
tion after it has been encased in a host egg cell),3' the resulting embryo can be
placed into a surrogate mother's uterus or into the uterus of the creature from
which the somatic cell was taken and allowed to gestate in what is then optimis-
tically hoped to be the normal way.
In truth, a vast majority of the clones so produced are extremely
abnormal-for example, being very much larger than normal; the oversized
fetus endangers the surrogate mother while gestating in a uterus in many cases
insufficiently large to contain the clone, which then dies, sometimes after having
fatally burst the surrogate mother's uterus.32 Two hundred and seventy-seven
failed attempts were required to produce Dolly,33 and even the misleadingly
named Identicat was the one success in 188 attempts to clone her parent. There
is also considerable evidence that the clones have the "wrong" genetic age. Dolly
and Matilda may have been the age of the creature from which they were cloned
plus their own chronological age.34
30. Cloning from a somatic cell had, however, previously been achieved with frogs by a differ-
ent method. See id.
31. See Jim Gilchrist, A Sheep of Faith, THE SCOTSMAN, Feb. 19, 2003, at 2, available at http://
www.news.scotsman.com/archive.cfm?id=208722003; see also Roslin Institute, Edinburgh, at
http://www.roslin.ac.uk/public/cloning.html (for various documents on nuclear transfer by
Dolly's creators).
32. See Philip Cohen, Bad Copies: Do Some Clones Lose Something Vital During their Creating?,
NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 3, 2001, at 7; see also Roslin Institute, Edinburgh, supra note 31, at http://
www.roslin.ac.uk/public/cloning.html.
33. See Gilchrist, supra note 31.
34. Id. There remains some controversy over the issue of advanced aging and the relevance of
shortened chromosomes. Contrary evidence on genetic aging-from the length of telomeres
(chromosome "caps")-has emerged in research on species other than sheep. See Gretchen Vogel,
In Contrast to Dolly, Cloning Resets Telomere Clockin Cattle, 288 SCIENCE 586 (2000). An added mis-
fortune is that Matilda's body was discovered only after a day in the summer heat. Following an
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These, in my opinion, are among the reasons why the National Academy of
Sciences was right to say that any attempt to clone a human being by use of the
Dolly method would be grossly premature." Professor Antinori of Italy is al-
ready working on such a project,36 Professor Panos Zavos37 claims to have pro-
duced a human embryo by the Dolly method, and the Raelians have announced
the birth of what they allege is a human clone produced by the same method.38 If
such a clone is born, it will not be the first human clone. It is not widely known
that human clones have been produced by in vitro fertilization (IVF) laborato-
ries since the early 1990s by the more conventional method of embryo splitting,
which also creates clones-whom we might describe as artificially induced
identical twins. The clones produced by the Dolly method are also near-
identical twins, but the Dolly method is, as we have seen, quite different from
embryo splitting; and all the scientific evidence suggests that it is much too un-
reliable, at least as yet, for use on humans. It is my opinion that, in the current
state of knowledge, attempts at human cloning by the Dolly method are extraor-
dinarily reckless. Even the IVF techniques that we tend to take much more for
granted as a part of reproductive technology are increasingly being found to be
associated with unexpected defects. A Swedish study, recently published in The
Lancet medical journal,39 is the first large-scale investigation into the risk of
autopsy (which did not reveal the cause of death), Matilda's remains were cremated. See John
Whitfield, Obituary: Dolly the Sheep, NATURE: SCI. UPDATE, Feb. 18, 2003, available at http'/
www.nature.com/nsu/030217/030217-6.html; see also Mysterious Death of Cloned Sheep, DAILY
MAIL, Feb. 8, 2003, at 9, available at 2003 WL 7266844.
35. Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, National Academy of Sciences,
National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human
Reproductive Cloning (National Academies Press 2002) [hereinafter National Academy of Sciences
Report].
36. Severino Antinori, an Italian physician, claimed to have cloned and implanted a human em-
bryo in one of his patients. See Alison Abbot, Disbelief Greets Claim for Creation of First Human
Clone, 416 NATURE 570 (2002).
37. Antonio Regalado, Human Embryo Is Cloned, Expert to Say in Paper, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9,
2003, at D2;availableat 2003 WL-WSJ 3964291.
38. The Raelian leader, Ral, founded Clonaid in 1997 and subsequently transferred responsi-
bility to a Raelian bishop, Brigitte Boisselier. According to the firm's website, Clonaid is "the first
company offering to clone human beings." Clonaid, at http://clonaid.com/article.php? 1.255 (last
visited Nov. 17,2003). As from mid-2003, they claim to have produced five healthy babies, the first
of them being Eve, reportedly born Dec. 26, 2002. Id.
39. B. Str6mberg et al., Neurological Sequelae in Children Born After In-Vitro Fertilisation: A
Population -Based Study, 359 LANCET 461 (2002), summarized in Test-Tube Babies Face Triple Risk of
Cerebral Palsy: Study, Agence Fr.-Presse, Feb. 7, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2335082.
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neurological disorders in children born after IVF treatment. It found that such
children are three times more likely to have cerebral palsy than those conceived
naturally. There are also risks to the mothers who have received hormone treat-
ment to increase egg production as part of the IVF process.4"
Those risks were not anticipated when IVF techniques were applied to hu-
mans, but many of the risks involved in cloning humans are very well under-
stood,4' hence my earlier comment about the recklessness that would in my
opinion necessarily be involved in any attempt to clone a human by the Dolly
method, in our present state of knowledge. Yet the technology moves so fast that
researchers are beginning to understand some of the problems relating to the age
of the clones, and we shall also see that technological developments relating to
stem cell cloning are already overtaking the ethical debate and the presidential
ban on federal funding for some of that work.
But why all this discussion of different types of cloning when I have promised
a lawyer's emphasis on biotechnological patents? Patents depend on the claimed
organism being, among other things, novel and not obvious. Especially where the
cloning takes place by means of nuclear transfer, as in Dolly's case, there will be a
contribution of mitochondrial DNA from the host cell into which the nucleus is
transferred. Although mitochondrial DNA, existing as it does outside the nu-
cleus, represents only a tiny proportion of the DNA of a cell, it results in a clone
that is not totally genetically identical to the parent. The presence of mitochon-
drial DNA may thus enable those holding patents on clones to fend off challengers
who allege that clones are not novel for the purposes of patent law because they are
identical to organisms already in existence (the parents). Another argument favor-
able to the patentees of clones would be that even if a clone were absolutely genet-
ically identical to the parent, a creature produced by the Dolly method of cloning
is novel in the sense that it is by definition different in kind from a parent pro-
duced by wholly different means. That argument might be maintained while fo-
cusing on the patent on the product as well as the patent on the process. The
Identicat and other animal clones have enabled us to realize that there are also sub-
tle changes to genetic material that are caused by environmental and developmen-
40. See, e.g., Experts Offer Hope of Avoiding Serious Complication of Assisted Reproduction,
WOMEN'S HEALTH WKLY., July 24, 2003, at 58,availableat 2003 WL 8993315.
41. Primates (including humans) appear to have genetic peculiarities that may preclude repro-
ductive cloning by the "Dolly technique" (somatic cell nuclear transfer). Gretchen Vogel,
Misguided Chromosomes Foil Primate Cloning, 300 SCIENCE 225-26 (2003).
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tal influences while an embryo is within the uterus. These result in clones that are
subtly, and sometimes not so subtly, genetically different from their parent even at
the point of birth,42 although that raises nice legal questions regarding the devel-
opmental stage at which the novelty of the clone qua invention is judged. Such
legal issues are unique to inventions that are not stable in the same way that a more
conventional invention, such as an inorganic machine, is stable, and they are par-
ticularly difficult to address where the invention is an organism that can go on to
reproduce. There are also fascinating issues regarding the extent to which a patent
may confer intellectual property rights on progeny and the constitutional impli-
cations if those progeny are human.
Niceties of patent law are already being argued in relation to existing pat-
ents on clones. Litigation has, for example, commenced between three compa-
nies (Geron, Infigen, and Advanced Cell Technology), each of which is claiming
"first to invent" rights to cloning and clones produced by the Dolly method.43
PPL Therapeutics, the corporate arm of Dolly's Roslin Institute, sold its patent
rights on her and the technology that produced her to Geron, a corporation
based in California. In terms of the monopoly rights involved, it is interesting to
note that Geron has secured an exclusive license for significant uses of the stem
cell patents from the University of Wisconsin.44 But Infigen, a Wisconsin-based
corporation argues that it was first with the cloning technology. Although Infi-
gen cloned its first creature, the bovine Gene, six months after Dolly was born,
U.S. patent law gives priority to the first to invent, rather than the first to file a
patent application. In most other jurisdictions the first to file prevails. To com-
pound the competing claims, a third company, Advanced Cell Technology
(ACT), which produced George and Charlie, the cattle clones, is claiming that it
was first to file a patent on the key technology of cloning animals that were ge-
netically engineered before they were cloned.
At the heart of the legal battle is whether the Patent Office fully understood
the applications made by Geron and Infigen before it granted a cloning patent to
ACT and its partner, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The court
hearings are likely to take years, as each company in turn presents its highly
42. Shin et al.,supra note 2, at 859.
43. See Nicholas Wapshott, Americans Fight over Legacy of Dolly the Sheep, TIMES (London),
Feb. 21, 2002, at 17, available at 2002 WL 4183503.
44. Antonio Regalado, U.S. Awards Grants to Extend Rolls of Stem -Cell Researchers, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 29, 2002, at B6, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3393121.
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complex scientific case. Judges will be asked to unravel the meaning and chro-
nology of twenty different cloning patents held by the three companies. Geron
claims that it was the first to develop the cloning process and the first to lay its
discovery before the Patent Office, but alleges that confusion on the part of
patent clerks prevented it from having its invention properly registered. Infigen
also claims that it was the first to invent cloning and that laboratory records will
prove its case. With overtones reminiscent of Little Dorrit,45 it alleges, inter alia,
that the Patent Office mislaid its claim. ACT's case rests upon its claim to having
understood the detail of the method used to clone an animal reliably. It is also
worth noting that the disquietingly named Genetic Savings & Clone Corpora-
tion of Texas, which produced the Identicat, operated under license from both
ACT and Geron.46
II. THE ART OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
I refer in my title to the art as well as the science of genetic engineering in
reference, in part, to the beauty of the DNA molecule and, in part, to the fact
that patent lawyers judge scientific progress by reference to what, in a term of
legal art, is known as "the state of the art." But art emerges in different forms,
and the naming of the clones and the companies that clone them has become an
art form as well as an important aspect of raising venture capital and launching
marketing campaigns. Careful thought is given to choosing names that will
make the clones seem appealing to the public. Hence Dolly; the Identicat (also
known as the Copy cat); and born, by no accident, on Christmas Day, the five
little piggies: Noel, Joy, Star, Mary, and Angel47 (names which conceal the fact
that all clones will be the same sex not only as the parent but as one another). We
also have Freddie, Mickey, and a host of appealing others-no Lady Macbeth or
Medusa as yet. The little piggies went off to market but, like the genetically en-
gineered Harvard mouse,48 did not do very well there, not least because of the
45. Charles Dickens, A Poor Man's Tale ofa Patent, HOUSEHOLD WORDS, October 19, 1850, avail-
able at http://www.classicbookshelf.comAibrary/charles dickens/reprinted-pieces/1 1/.
46. Wapshott, supra note 43, at 17.
47. Mark Court, These Five Little Piggies Lead the Race for the £5bn Organ Transplant Market,
TIMES (London), Jan. 3, 2002, at 1,available at 2002 WL 4170914.
48. The Harvard mouse (also known as the OncoMouse) proved not to be as useful an innova-
tion as anticipated. It was overly susceptible to cancer, making it difficult to draw useful research
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unfortunate public relations and market management crisis caused by the coin-
cidence, if it was a coincidence, of the announcement of the piglets' arrival with
the publication by a rival corporation of news of Dolly's premature arthritis."
The importance of the art and science of naming may also be demonstrated by
Monsanto's now infamous "terminator" technology. Monsanto's "germination
control technology," designed to prevent farmers from successfully using saved
seed, proved to be a commercial failure and was withdrawn from the market.
The seeds doubtless lacked appeal in principle as well as in name, but their mar-
ketability was not enhanced when detractors dubbed them "terminator seeds"
and that tag persisted.5"
While focus on public relations and naming may well pay literal dividends
for corporations, we must not be diverted from the substance of the so-called or-
ganic inventions in relation to which patent rights are sought. If we focus for the
moment on physical rather than ethical concerns in relation to animals engi-
neered with a mixture of human and nonhuman animal genes, we find, for ex-
ample, concerns about the transmission of animal viruses to humans.5' Cross-
species transmission of viruses has been linked with AIDS and SARS, so we
have some knowledge of how dangerous it can be. The risks are significant es-
pecially when there is manipulation of RNA as well as DNA in transgenic crea-
tures. Herds of pigs have had human genes inserted into their genomes so that
the pigs can be used as a source of organs for pig-to-human heart transplants.
Scientists hope that organs from such genetically modified pigs will be less likely
to trigger rejection in humans, but at the current state of knowledge, it is impos-
sible to screen for all pig viruses that may be present and as yet unidentified.
These concerns are heightened by consideration by the FDA of the market-
ing, for consumption and other uses, of the meat and dairy products of animal
conclusions from its laboratory use. The Supreme Court of Canada has refused a patent to the
Harvard mouse. Comm'r of Patents, 219 D.L.R. (4th), at 577-78.
49. The Roslin Institute released news of Dolly's arthritis on Jan. 4, 2002, just ten days after the
piglets' arrival. The Roslin Institute, Edinburgh, supra note 31, at http://www.roslin.ac.uk/news/
articles/141.html. At this point, Roslin had a long-standing association with Geron. Id. at http://
www.roslin.ac.uk/ news/press/articles/79.html (Roslin's May 4, 1999 announcement). PPL Thera-
peutics and the Roslin Institute had originally been part of a single entity, but their cooperation in
1996 and 1997 was already the labor of two enterprises. PPL presents its own history at http://
www.ppl-therapeutics.com/who/who_4.html.
50. Ehsan Masood, Monsanto Set to Back Down over 'Terminator' Gene?, 396 NATURE 503 (1998).
51. See Nell Boyce, Down on the Organ Farm, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 16, 2003, at 47,
available at 2003 WL 2021782.
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clones.52 This would open the way for a multibillion-dollar cloning industry, pro-
viding everything from cloned family pets, specialized meat and dairy products,
and organs for transplantation, to animals that have been genetically engineered
to produce medicines. This practice is known as "pharming," and cattle clones
have already changed hands for large sums, in anticipation of the sale of their un-
conventional milk and meat.
I have thus far referred mainly to patents on animal clones, even though the
patents when tested in court may be regarded in some jurisdictions as broad
enough to cover human clones and cloning. How does patent law deal with the
patenting of human clones? We have seen that humans have been cloned in IVF
labs by means of embryo splitting,53 even if not yet by the highly risky and techni-
cally imperfect Dolly method-and there is also the vexed question of stem cell
cloning. On June 9, 1997, President Clinton proposed to Congress legislation that
would have banned human reproductive, as opposed to research or therapeutic,
cloning. Reproductive cloning involves creating a cloned embryo and implanting it
into a woman with the goal of creating a child. Research cloning, or therapeutic clon-
ing, involves the creation of cloned human embryos that are then destroyed by the
removal of their stem cells for research or therapeutic purposes.54 The terms as cur-
rently applied are confusing because reproductive cloning may in some cases be a
first step toward therapy. The legislation proposed by President Clinton never
came to fruition,55 but he had already banned federal funding for human cloning.56
52. See Jennifer L. Brown, Beef Ranchers Await FDA's Call on Cloning, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 19, 2003, at E2, available at 2003 WL 3549828; Roy Bragg, The Hoof Race:
Companies Are Trying to Develop a Reliable Animal-Cloning Technique That Can Be Mass-Produced,
Marketed, SAN ANTONiO EXPREss-NEWS, Sept. 2, 2002, at 1A,availableat 2002 WL 23795767.
53. See Patenting Resources, supra note 6, at 124; J. L. Hall et al., Experimental Cloning of Human
Polyploid Embryos Using an Artificial Zona Pellucida, 60 FERTILITY & STERILITY S1 (1993) (Supp.
Oct. 11-14, 1993). Contra Nat'l Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction, Report on Human
Cloning Through Embryo Splitting:An Amber Light, 4 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 251 (1994).
54. See Remarks on Human Cloning Legislation, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 571, 608 (Apr.
15, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020410-4.html.
55. See Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1601, 105th Cong. (1998);seealso Press Release, The
Executive Office of the President of the U.S.: Office of Mgmt and Budget, S. 1601 - Human Clon-
ing Prohibition Act (Feb. 9, 1998), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblegislative/sap/105-2/
S1601-s.html.
56. President Clinton's restrictions on funding human cloning began in December 1994 and
were renewed and expanded. See, e.g., Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal Funding for
Cloning of Human Beings, PUB. PAPERS (1997) bk. 1, at 233, available at http://grantsl.nih.gov/
grants/policy/ cloning-directive.htm.
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President Bush has announced a ban on federal funding for certain types of
human stem cell cloning,57 but the Senate has so far failed to follow the House58
in passing legislation that would ban human cloning. Nor has there been any at-
tempt to restrict the privately funded research and development that is entirely
unfettered and proceeding apace. It is very important to appreciate in the con-
text of genetic engineering that the balance over the last twenty years or so has
shifted very markedly, with the vast majority of funding for research and devel-
opment now coming from the private rather than the public sector.
In broad terms, therapeutic cloning may involve producing an embryo from
a cell taken from the patient. This embryo, sometimes known as a blastocyst59 be-
cause it is at a very early stage, is allowed to develop for several days so that stem
cells from which derive the specialized cells needed to repair spinal injuries and
many other diseases, might be harvested. Critics of therapeutic cloning argue that
it is a slippery slope that will inevitably lead to reproductive cloning, with identical
copies of human beings being produced to satisfy the vanity of people wealthy
enough to pay for the privilege. We have already noted that the first pet clone, a
cat, was created recently in the United States.6" Critics also suggest that human
cloning is unnecessary because of the rapid strides made by scientists in isolating
stem cells from adults and inducing them to diversify into many different tissue
types. Both methods could in principle produce cells or tissues compatible with the
patient, because they would originate from his own cells. But the adult route by-
passes the need to create a clone, and raises no ethical dilemmas. Few, however, be-
lieve that adult stem cells yet offer clear scientific advantages over embryonic cells
and, for the time being, it will probably be necessary to continue working on em-
bryos in order to understand how to manipulate adult stem cells.
President Bush's pronouncement banning federal funding for human clon-
ing covers both reproductive and research or therapeutic cloning. The British
57. Press Release, The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Embryonic Stem
Cell Research (August 9, 2001), at http'//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/2000l80 9 -
l.html; cf Remarks on Human Cloning Legislation, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 571, 608 (Apr.
15, 2002) (speech on President's desire to ban human cloning, except for research conducted on
animal and human adult stem cells), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/
04/20020410-4.html.
58. On February 27, 2003, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill that would ban all
human cloning. See Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 534, 108th Cong. (2003),avail-
able at http://thomas.loc.gov.
59. A blastocyst is an embryo that has developed for five to seven days after fertilization.
60. See Shin et al., supra note 2.
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Parliament has passed legislation to allow therapeutic cloning research while
banning reproductive cloning.6 That position has also been endorsed by a well-
argued National Academy of Sciences report.62 Even with this important re-
search continuing, it could be years before it is usefully employed in clinics. Sci-
entists will need to learn how to ensure that stem cells become the specialized
cells required. And if human cloning proves the only way forward, gaining ac-
cess to an adequate supply of host human egg cells could be an inhibiting factor
unless related technological advances are made.
The EU Directive on the patenting of biotechnological inventions bans the
patenting of the human body, at the various stages of its formation and develop-
ment, as well as processes for cloning human beings,63 but no such express pro-
hibition appears in U.S. patent legislation, although the Patent Office has made
relevant policy decisions.' Nor does the U.S. have an express "morality" test in
its patent legislation. It is important to remember that patents on the genes of
particular tribes and patents on numerous nucleotide sequences or expressed se-
quence tags (ESTs) of the human genome have already been granted,65 and since
the grant of the patents on Dolly, which extend to cloned human cell lines, we
are no longer in the realm of science fiction.
III. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Thirteenth Amendment may form the basis of future constitutional
challenges arising out of the grant of patents on human clones-and here we are
thinking of reproductive cloning resulting in the birth of a child, rather than ther-
apeutic cloning which, as we have seen, destroys a cloned embryo that has not ex-
isted for more than a few days in a step toward a therapeutic process. We might
envisage a scenario where a person is cloned because of special qualities in his
61. Human Reproductive Cloning Act, 2001, c. 23 (Eng.).
62. National Academy of Sciences Report,supra note 35.
63. See Council Directive 98/44/EC, art. 6, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13.
64. If the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention as a whole encompasses a
human being, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 must be made, indicating that the claimed
invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 2105 (8th ed. 2001).
But, in an age of partly human and partly non-human animal chimeras, what is the broadest rea-
sonable interpretation of... a human being? See Patenting Resources, supra note 6, at 123.
65. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,397,696 (issued Mar. 14, 1995).
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blood. Once the clone is born, the clone might receive payment for samples of his
special blood, for example, for use for medical purposes.66 A company arguing
that it has patent rights over that clone by virtue of a prior patent, might then ask
for royalties in respect of the use of the clone's blood, thus in effect claiming a
share of the clone's earnings. Or an attempt might be made to require the clone
to market its blood, so that the patent is "worked." Might such a situation cause
the Supreme Court to decide that the granting of patents on human clones is
unconstitutional by virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on
slavery-or unconstitutional at least in applications that would allow the patent
holder rights as against the born clone? Given past jurisprudence, it is perhaps
more likely that the Court would prefer to address these issues as questions of
"liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment, to which we shall return shortly in
a slightly different context.
The argument in relation to the Thirteenth Amendment is far from un-
complicated, not least because a patent does not confer ownership of the pat-
ented entity, as opposed to a right to exclude others from "making, using, or
vending the thing patented,without the permission of the patentee."67 And this
against a constitutional background which in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 en-
ables Congress "[tjo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." This Clause has been authoritatively in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.,68 which, although
written nearly forty years ago, might have been directed to exactly the problem
we have today. Justice Clark stated:
The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation .... [T]he
Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach
the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor
may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innova-
tion, advancement or social benefit granted thereby. Moreover,
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects
are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to
66. Cf Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal., 1990).
67. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (1 How) 539, 549 (1852).
68. 383 U.S. 1, at 5-6 (1966).
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restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation, ad-
vancement and things which may add to the sum of useful knowl-
edge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must "promote the Progress of... useful
Arts." This is the standard [Court's emphasis] expressed in the
Constitution and it may not be ignored.69
This interpretation of the extremely broad language of Article I might assist
future courts, in compelling circumstances-where alleged patent rights were
being used in an attempt to control and profit from the activities of human
clones-to decide that the Federal Government should not preside over the grant
of patents on viable human clones nor indeed on basic information about the
human genome that should be publicly available. "Congress may not authorize
the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available."7 ° In the
year 2000, President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair released a joint statement
in which they applauded the efforts and good intentions of an international group
of publicly funded scientists who published data on the Internet, regarding such
human genes as they had sequenced, in a manner that would inevitably block pat-
ents on what Clinton and Blair, rightly in my opinion, described as "raw funda-
mental information about the human DNA sequence and its variants."'" Sadly,
their patent offices did not follow the spirit of this announcement, and patents
continue to be granted on unmodified human gene sequences.
IV. MORALITY TESTS IN PATENT LAW
I mentioned a moment ago that, in addition to an express ban on the patenting
of human clones, the European patent system, unlike its American counterpart,
has an express morality provision that prohibits the patenting of any invention
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id.
71. See Declan Butler, US/UK Statement on Genome Data Prompts Debate on "Free Access," 404
NATURE 324 (2000).
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF GENETIC MODIFICATION
that is contrary to morality or public order.72 The Harvard mouse initially scurried
into difficulties with this provision in the European patent system because of con-
siderations of environmental risk relating to the possible escape of the mice into
the environment and the danger that this might result in the spread of their cancer
susceptibility genes. The suffering of the animal was also taken into account
under the morality provision. A European patent was, however, eventually
awarded on the ground that the suffering of the mouse and the possible environ-
mental risks were outweighed by what was perceived at the time as the benefit to
mankind of the modified mouse. The Upjohn mouse application, which reached
the European Patent Office at almost exactly the same time, failed the morality
test because, unlike the mouse genetically engineered for the purpose of use in the
search for a cure for cancer, its suffering was not in the final analysis found to be
outweighed by a sufficient benefit to man. It was genetically modified so as to be
entirely hairless as part of the search for a cure for baldness. Such a warm blooded,
hairless creature would suffer, and the European Patent Office refused to con-
clude that, in moral terms, this suffering was outweighed by what it saw as the
merely cosmetic potential of the Upjohn mouse.
In the United States, a common law morality test flourished in relation, for
example, to gambling machines in the 1800s"3 but since then has rather fallen
into disuse. The common law test could re-emerge with renewed vigor in this
context. It may be provoked into action by applications such as Stuart New-
man's, in which a patent was sought on a partly animal, partly human chimera.
74
Various chimeras have already not just hobbled but veritably sprinted through
patent offices. The Newman application was a test patent application that ex-
pressly raised the question of what percentage of added or substituted human
genes an essentially nonhuman genetically engineered animal would have to
have before it would be regarded as human by the U.S. Patent Office.
75
72. Note that both NAFFA, North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, art. 1709(2),
32 I.L.M. 289, 673 and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex IC: Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), April 15, 1994, art.
27(2), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 provide that contracting states may exclude from patentability any in-
ventions the exploitation of which would be contrary to the ordrepublic or morality.
73. Early gambling-device cases (e.g., Nat'l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89 (N.D. Ill.,
1889)) are discussed in Chisum on Patents at 4.03[l][a].
74. Patenting Resources, supra note 6, at 126.
75. Note also Stuart Newman and Jeremy Rifkin's "humouse" (human-mouse) chimera patent
application. In addition to extensive media coverage, the application was summarized by Rifkin
YVONNE CRIPPS
In a recent conference in this Law School, organized and conceived of by
Fred Aman and John Applegate, we considered the topic of sustainable develop-
ment, and I was moved by some of these recent biotechnological developments
to address the question of sustainable development outside its usual agricultural
context and in relation to human beings.76 I shall not re-examine today issues of
the extent to which biotechnology is changing what being "human" actually
means in legal and other terms, except perhaps to ask whether and at what per-
centage of human genes these human/animal chimeras will be humans with
human rights under the U.S. Constitution. But perhaps I should just note here
that, in art. 6(2), the European Directive on biotechnological inventions77 pro-
hibits the patenting of"(a) processes for cloning human beings; (b) processes for
modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; [and] (c) uses of
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes[.]""T These are all de-
scribed as contrary to public order or morality. The Directive also provides, in
art. 5(1), that "[t]he human body, at the various stages of its formation and devel-
opment, and the simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence
or partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions."
79
A prohibition on patenting inventions or processes, the use of which would
be contrary to morality, does not of course prevent the development of such in-
ventions or processes. While a lack of patent protection may discourage expen-
diture on researching and developing immoral inventions, it will not entirely
prevent those activities. Separate legislation would be required for that. And if
there is no disclosure through patents, the public and the scientific community
will be less well informed about work that might otherwise take place under
on his website. Jeremy Rifkin, The Humouse Human/Animal Chimera Patent Challenge, at http://
www.foet.org/chimerapatent.htm (last visited Sep. 18, 2003). The United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office issued a media advisory that a patent application directed to human/non-human chi-
meras has recently been discussed in the news media. It is the position of the PTO that inventions
directed to human/non-human chimeras could, under certain circumstances, not be patentable be-
cause, among other things, they would fail to meet the public policy and morality aspects of the
utility requirement. Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Facts on Patent-
ing Life Forms Having a Relationship to Humans (April 1, 1998), at http'//www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/com/speeches/98-06.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2003)
76. See Patenting Resources, supra note 6, at 123.
77. Council Directive 98/44/EC,supra note 63, at 18.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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cover of confidentiality." It should also be noted that if researchers attempt to
protect the fruits of their labor by means of trade secrecy rather than patents,
they may escape regulation. Patent offices regard themselves as unqualified to
judge questions of morality, and it is not surprising that, like the Court in
Chakrabarty, they would prefer to leave that role to the legislative branch.
The European Directive on the protection of biotechnological inventions
provides that patent protection for an invention cannot be denied on grounds of
protecting public order solely because the exploitation of the invention is prohib-
ited by law."l This means that patent protection may be provided for inventions
that the protecting nation considers in some sense or senses immoral. Moral
values can also be protected by separate legislative prohibitions on exploitation.
On this view, inventors gain the benefits of patent protection and an incentive to
innovate, but governments can still discourage research within their borders by
prohibiting exploitation of inventions considered harmful.
V. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
I have tried to confine myself to patent law issues today, but additional con-
stitutional questions arise in relation to other aspects of biotechnology. Could
cloning emerge as so highly valued a reproductive or therapeutic technique that
the Supreme Court would overturn a statutory ban on cloning as contrary to
Fourteenth Amendment protections of "life, liberty or property?" Will parents,
for example, argue that cloning is necessary to save the life of an existing child (in
other words, the sibling of an intended clone), and that a statutory ban would be
contrary to the liberty of the child to undergo a life-saving medical procedure?
Will sick persons argue that a ban on federally funded cloning breaches a right
to choose life-saving treatment?
80. See Eugene Russo, Cow-Human Cell News Raises Ethical Issues, THE SCIENTIST, Dec. 7, 1998,
at 1, available at http://www.the-scientist.com/yr1998/dec/russopl-981207.html ("IT]he move
into the private sector might be one of the unintended and undesirable consequences of [a] con-
gressional ban. Not only are bioethical concerns more difficult to monitor, but academic and gov-
ernment scientists have limited access to potentially valuable, beneficial research.")
81. See Council Directive 98/44/EC,supra note 63, at 18 ("Inventions shall be considered unpat-
entable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality; how-
ever, exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or
regulation.")
YVONNE CRIPPS
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that the privacy right, which is pro-
tected under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty, includes a
woman's right to choose to end her pregnancy. 2 The Court did not fully explore
what separates the fundamental right to privacy that was infringed by antiabor-
tion regulation from less fundamental types of privacy and liberty that are not pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause. It did, however, give examples of spheres of
privacy in which fundamental rights may be found. These include choices regard-
ing "marriage,... procreation,. . . contraception,.., family relationships,.., and
child rearing and education."83 But while the early reproductive choice cases fo-
cused on family and marriage, the Court's decisions have made clear that the right
is one to personal autonomy, though that too is different from a right to life-saving
treatment. A choice concerning medical treatment does not necessarily change the
nature of a family, unless the word "family" is viewed extremely broadly, but other
aspects of the decision in Roe, and the subsequent abortion cases, run counter to
that argument. Antiabortion laws have been held to be unconstitutional when
they do not allow an exception where the woman's health is at risk.84 This suggests
that the fundamentality of a woman's right to choose an abortion is based on the
woman's right to make choices concerning her own health, in addition to her right
to make choices about the nature of her family. The Court directly supported this
stance in Stenberg v. Carhart,8 5 in which it struck down a prohibition on a particu-
lar method of abortion-sometimes called the "partial birth" technique. This
technique is safer for the woman than the alternatives. The majority held that the
state could not prohibit the safer procedure unless it allowed an exception to pre-
serve the life and health of the woman.
A similar conclusion can also be drawn from the decision in Washington v.
Glucksberg, in which the Supreme Court ruled upon a statute that made it a
crime to assist a suicide. The Court upheld the statute, recognizing that there is
no fundamental right to end one's life. A majority of the Court, however, indi-
cated that the case would have been decided differently if it had involved some-
82. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
83. Id. at 152-53.
84. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) ("We also reaffirm Roe's holding
that 'subsequent to viability, the State... may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion
except where it is necessary ... for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." (quoting
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65)).
85. 530 U.S. 914, 936-37 (2000).
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one who was dying in severe pain and who simply wanted to take enough
medication to remove the pain, even if it meant hastening death.86 This tends to
indicate a sphere of privacy, under the constitutional guarantee of liberty, which
includes a person's right to choose to undergo desired medical procedures in cer-
tain circumstances. What sets this choice apart from other, nonfundamental
spheres of privacy, is the fact that this choice concerns a person's own fate and the
treatment of his own body.
In the context of abortion, the Court has held that a law infringes a person's
right to choose abortion if it places an undue burden on the choice to have an
abortion before viability" Legislation banning human cloning would place
more than an undue burden on the petitioner's choice of medical treatment. It
would preclude the choice entirely, possibly infringing a right to undergo life-
saving medical treatment. Prior to Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Lawrence v.
Texas,88 the Court asked whether the state had a compelling interest to the con-
trary. In Casey, the court created the "undue burden" standard of review, asking
whether the governmental restriction on liberty amounted to an undue burden.
In Lawrence it was not entirely clear what standard was being used. This may
have been because the Government's interest could be characterized as a purely
moral one that was clearly not sufficient to outweigh the petitioner's right to per-
sonal autonomy in the making of life-shaping decisions. Future cases will pre-
sumably resolve the question of the appropriate standard for review for
Fourteenth Amendment claims of protected liberty, but for now, let us apply the
traditional strict-scrutiny analysis.
If legislation banning human cloning would arguably infringe a fundamen-
tal right by blocking life-saving treatment, the State would have the burden of
asserting a compelling interest to which the legislation was narrowly tailored.
First, the State might assert that it is protecting the potential life created by the
cloning process. Secondly, the State might assert an interest in precluding the
unnatural creation of human life. The first interest is similar to that asserted by
states that have sought to outlaw abortion. In the abortion context, the Court has
held that the potential life of a fetus outweighs the woman's right to choose abor-
86. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737-38 (1997) ("There is no dispute that dying patients ... can ob-
tain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths.") (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
88. Id. at 833; Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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tion after the point of viability. Viability is defined by the Court as the point at
which the fetus, with or without artificial aid, "presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb."' 9 In the era of the new reproduc-
tive biotechnologies we might even imagine the fetus gestating in an artificial
womb. In the case that we are envisaging, however, the distinction between pre-
and post-viability is not entirely helpful. On the one hand, a cloned fetus may be
considered viable from the time it is "conceived," because it was created with ar-
tificial aid, and techniques may be created to sustain its life until "birth." On the
other hand, human material can certainly be cloned in such a way that it would
never have the potential of leading a life in any ordinary sense. Presumably, the
medical procedure in the case that we are envisaging would involve the latter
type of cloning. The State's interest in protecting this particularly attenuated
form of life would have difficulty competing with the petitioner's privacy right.
The State's second interest might be harder to pin down. It might relate not
to the need to prevent the destruction of life, but rather to an interest in prevent-
ing its creation. The State might essentially be asserting an interest in preventing
scientists and doctors from playing God. The term "playing God" is sometimes
used in relation to doctors, who regularly hold the lives of patients in their
hands. In the case envisaged, however, the term takes on new meaning. Medical
scientists might actually be said to be creating new life. The technique of cloning
can appear quite similar, in the abstract, to the biblical account of the creation of
Eve from Adam's rib. The State's argument might in essence be that medical
scientists are tampering with forces with which they should not interfere. But is
morality per se an adequate government interest? In Lawrence v. Texas, the citi-
zen's liberty interest (in private, consensual sexual behavior) outweighed the
government's interest in protecting morals, as some might see them. In dissent,
Justice Scalia laments that a multitude of state laws on sexual morals will "be
called into question by today's decision."9
Perhaps the conclusion would be different in the case of cloning where an
embryo is deliberately created for the purpose of its destruction for medical use
or when another human is born as a result of cloning.
89. Coulautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,387 (1979), overruled in part on otherground" by Webster
v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
90. 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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On the other hand, cloning might be seen simply as the next step in the
science of directing the growth of human tissue. For centuries, doctors have used
techniques to direct the growth of patients' tissues. Wounds have been stitched,
and skin removed from one part of the body and grafted to others. These tech-
niques use patients' own tissues to fill in wounds or replace damaged parts. Med-
ical techniques involving cloning are quite similar. The primary difference is
that human material is removed from the patient, or another, and grown in a
place completely separate from the patient's body. The material may be seen to
take on its own identity, separate from the patient. Even where the cloned mate-
rial is not created as a potential life, the idea that scientists could create a poten-
tial life using similar techniques, or indeed create an embryo with a view to its
destruction (albeit after only a few days of gestation and arguably for laudable
reasons) makes legislators and others uneasy.
An interest in preventing the cloning of human material, where no viable life
is created, is, however, a purely moral interest. Of course, this may be said of al-
most all law but, in the case we are considering, the moral interest arguably con-
flicts with a constitutionally protected fundamental right to life-saving treatment.
The State might find it difficult to present evidence that cloning of human tissue
to produce nonviable material (in terms of legal definitions of viability) would be
detrimental to society in any way other than that it offends prevailing moral
values, and, as in Lawrence, this may not amount to a compelling State interest.
Then there are the entirely different constitutional arguments that might be
made by or in relation to a human clone who is born and lives to reflect upon the
moment. Most of these arguments are extremely unlikely to succeed, but they
take us into new legal realms in an examination of the meaning of personhood
and questions such as whether human cloning, and the patenting of human
clones, might infringe or impinge upon either the personhood of the entity who
is cloned, the clone, or both. Since even clones are not genetically identical, such
arguments would be extremely difficult to sustain and not just for that reason
alone. Another paper beckons on these points and on whether a statutory ban on
patenting human clones would infringe a scientist's right to "property" within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.9' If the scenarios themselves seem
91. The current trend is to interpret Fourteenth Amendment property as not including intel-
lectual property, and when faced with the situations we are considering here, the Court would be
likely to adhere ever more firmly to that approach.
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unlikely, remember that we already have the production of so-called designer
babies whereby IVF techniques and genetic screening are used to create siblings
whose cells could cure existing children. In a practice now approved by the
English Court of Appeal,92 the embryos created by IVF are screened to find one
or more that are free from the illness in question and have a blood type matching
that of the existing child. The other embryos may be stored or discarded.93
CONCLUSION
It is almost exactly twenty-five years since I first had occasion to speak94 and
write95 about the legal implications of biotechnology. Shortly thereafter, the Su-
preme Court of the United States addressed the new technology in a case involv-
ing the constitutional dimensions of an attempt to claim patent rights over a
genetically engineered organism. The Court in Chakrabarty deliberated upon
the legal and scientific dimensions of a modified micro-organism-a single-
celled bacterium. Despite having been subjected by counsel for the Commis-
sioner of Patents to a "gruesome parade of horribles,"96 a majority of the justices
asserted that Chakrabarty's engineering of the bacterium had turned it into a
patentable invention.
Nearly twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court of Canada has refused to
uphold the patent on Harvard's genetically engineered mouse, drawing a dis-
tinction between patents on micro-organisms and those on higher animals.
While some of the arguments in the Chakrabarty case are very recognizable in
the litigation and debate of today, the twenty-first century "parade of horribles"
92. The Queen v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Auth., 3 All E.R. 257 (C.A. 2003),
available at 2003 WL 21047341.
93. In a decision of July 27,1994, the French Conseil Constitutionnel decided that it would not
be unconstitutional, in certain circumstances, to destroy embryos that had been stored for at least
five years. This law, formerly L152-8, now L2141-7 in the Code de Sant Publique, also provides
that a human embryo shall not be conceived or used for commercial or industrial purposes. That
part of the law was not challenged. Cons. const., July 27, 1994, 94-343/344, available at httpi/
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr.
94. The speech took place at the 49th annual meeting of the Australian and New Zealand
Academy for the Advancement of Science. Extracts from the speech were published as Yvonne
Cripps, Novel Genetic Techniques-Some Legal Issues, 36 N.Z. Sci. REV. 27 (1979).
95. See generally YVONNE CRIPPS, CONTROLLING TECHNOLOGY: GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE
LAW (1980).
96. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 314.
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is considerably more disquieting, despite our increased familiarity with some of
the specters along the way. We must now confront not only engineered micro-
organisms, but also, for example, claims over clones, and patents on partly
human and partly nonhuman animal chimeras, such as were put to the United
States Patent Office in the Newman application. And the Supreme Court may
soon have to consider the intricacies of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments in such contexts in addition to the now familiar arguments regarding
Article I, Section 8.
In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court emphasized that it was for Congress to
regulate the technology and to ban its unacceptable manifestations as well as at-
tempts to patent them.97 By the time the Harvard mouse case reached the Su-
preme Court of Canada, the justices had had almost a quarter of a century to
observe that Congress and the Canadian legislature have shown little sign of will-
ingness to intervene, particularly where such intervention would apply to the pri-
vate sector, where the vast majority of genetic engineering now takes place.
Largely untrammeled corporate interest in this field has combined with a
late twentieth and early twenty-first century tendency to extend the scope and
application of intellectual property law, and to distort its traditional tenets to ac-
commodate individuals who seek to annex objects, practices, treatments, and,
increasingly, higher organisms, which would previously and properly have been
regarded as part of the shared public commons, or indeed of nature itself. We
have strayed disadvantageously far from the anti-monopolistic warnings con-
tained in the decision in the Case of Monopolies,9" with its emphasis on the need
to keep sight of the overarching public interest. Perhaps the Canadian Harvard
mouse case will come to represent a recent sounding of those distant echoes. Nor
have the extending tentacles of intellectual property law been confined to un-
precedented overreaching in the patent and biotechnological spheres, 99 though
their elongated grasp is in my opinion most remarkable there.
Intellectual property law was designed to encourage innovation by requir-
ing full disclosure of inventions as society's price for the limited monopoly rights
that patents confer on inventors. Knowledge about inventions would thereby be
97. See generally, id.
98. See Darcy v. Alle[i]n, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602).
99. Copyright terms have been extended and new forms of protection devised, enacted, and ju-
dicially sanctioned.
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made available to the widest possible audience, and the system of rights would
facilitate and encourage further inventiveness. Modern manifestations of this
branch of law, particularly in the biotechnological sphere, are from time to time
allowing putative inventors to patent that which does not conform to traditional
patent standards of novelty, nonobviousness, and useful function, not to mention
morality. Some intellectual property regimes thus simultaneously and paradox-
ically grasp would-be inventors and the potential recipients of the benefits of this
knowledge in a choking grip, blocking access to the raw materials of nature and
research by making those materials subject to monopolistic control, and by in-
cluding in the patent grant discoveries of natural phenomena and common
knowledge, as well as true inventions.
Patent offices should be more circumspect in granting questionable patents,
and judges should be more reluctant to uphold them. If outright bans on certain
types of subject-matters and activities, or their patenting, are too daring for Con-
gress, and might in certain cases even be regarded as unconstitutional, our legis-
lators might at least make a start by broadening the "experimental use"
exception and controlling more rigorously the patenting of therapeutic and di-
agnostic methods.
